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LESSON UNLEARNED?: REGULATORY REFORM AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
John Crawford ∗
INTRODUCTION
A central lesson of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008 was that ﬁrms
behaving like banks should be regulated like banks. Nonbanks that
perform the same economic function as banks—so-called “shadow
banks”—create the same risks and demand the same regulatory response
as depository institutions with bank charters.1 The principal legislative
reform passed in the wake of the crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act,2 made
several important, albeit incomplete, advances in applying elements of
the banking regulatory regime to shadow banks. These achievements are
now at risk, as President Trump has promised to “do a big number on
Dodd-Frank.”3 In what has been interpreted as a ﬁrst salvo in the effort to
dismantle Dodd-Frank,4 he issued an executive order directing the
Secretary of the Treasury to conduct a wholesale review of the current
ﬁnancial regulatory landscape.5 While executive and agency action can
∗. Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law. I am
grateful to Abe Cable, Scott Dodson, Randy Guynn, Dave Owen, and Andrew Tuch for
helpful comments.
1. As discussed in more detail below, the term “shadow banking” refers in this Piece
not to unregulated ﬁnancial activities writ large but rather to one speciﬁc activity: funding
a portfolio of ﬁnancial assets with lots of short-term debt. See infra note 36 and
accompanying text. For an excellent account of the different legal entities that have been
deﬁned as “banks” under the Bank Holding Company Act, see generally Saule T. Omarova
& Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding
Company Regulation in the United States, 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 113 (2011).
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
3. Glenn Thrush, Trump Vows to Dismantle Dodd-Frank “Disaster,” N.Y. Times (Jan. 30,
2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-dodd-frank-regulations.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
4. See, e.g., Michael C. Bender & Damian Paletta, Donald Trump Plans to Undo
Dodd-Frank
Law,
Fiduciary
Rule,
Wall
St.
J.
(Feb.
3,
2017),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-moves-to-undo-dodd-frank-law-1486101602 (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review).
5. Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 8, 2017). The Executive Order
lays out six prima facie unobjectionable principles, such as “empower[ing] Americans to
make independent ﬁnancial decisions and informed choices in the marketplace,”
“advanc[ing] American interests in international ﬁnancial regulatory negotiations and
meetings,” and directing the Treasury Secretary to review current laws and regulations to
see if they conform to these principles. Id.
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roll back some of Dodd-Frank’s reforms, durable structural reversals will
require legislation.6 The precise contours of such legislation are hard to
predict, but most commentators believe the best starting point for
considering what it might look like is the Financial CHOICE Act7
(CHOICE Act) sponsored by Representative Jeb Hensarling, chairman of
the House Committee on Financial Services.8 This Piece argues that
several key provisions from the CHOICE Act evince a fundamental
conceptual mistake that threatens to undermine the ﬁnancial stability of
the United States.9 It is important to articulate this argument now so that
it can inform the debate prior to the enactment of any new law, rather
6. In addition to the fact that policy can be reversed again under a future
administration, most ﬁnancial regulatory agencies are independent and can occasionally
prove refractory under White House pressure. See, e.g., Damian Paletta & Deborah
Solomon, Geithner Vents at Regulators as Overhaul Stumbles, Wall St. J. (Aug. 4, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB124934399007303077 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing tensions between the Treasury Secretary and various agency heads
over the direction of reform in 2009).
7. CHOICE is an acronym for Creating Hope and Opportunity for Investors,
Consumers and Entrepreneurs. See U.S. House of Representatives Fin. Servs. Comm.,
The Financial CHOICE Act, Executive Summary, http://ﬁnancialservices.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/financial_choice_act-_executive_summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/PNK5-LFT7]
(last visited Feb. 26, 2017); see also Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th
Cong. (2016).
A revised version of the CHOICE Act was released on April 19, 2017. See Discussion
Draft of the Financial Choice Act, H.R. __, 115th Cong. (2017), http://ﬁnancial
services.house.gov/uploadedfiles/choice_2.0_discussion_draft.pdf
[http://perma.cc/HR9FAFLL]. The key provisions discussed in this Piece remain substantively unchanged in the
new version of the Act.
8. See, e.g., Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, The Trump Transition and Possible
Directions
for
Financial
Regulatory
Reform
1
(Nov.
17,
2016),
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/ﬁles/2016-11-17-trump-transition-ﬁnancialchoice-act-only-the-beginning.pdf [http://perma.cc/4R4M-W34D] (identifying the
CHOICE Act as “a starting point that signals a potential general direction of travel for
ﬁnancial reform”); Debevoise & Plimpton, The Outlook for Financial Regulatory Reform
Under President Trump 2 (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.debevoise.com/~/
media/ﬁles/insights/publications/2016/11/20161130b_the_outlook_for_ﬁnancial_regul
atory_reform_under_president_trump.pdf [http://perma.cc/GN4B-AGAN] (explaining
the CHOICE Act as “a blueprint for the types of [ﬁnancial] reforms that a Republicancontrolled House and Senate may pursue”); Ryan Tracy, How a Financial Council
Republicans Loathe Could Work in Their Favor, Wall St. J. (Jan. 17, 2017), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/how-a-ﬁnancial-council-republicans-loath-could-work-in-their-favor1484581368 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Tracy, A Financial Council
Republicans Loathe] (stating that Representative Hensarling’s bill “is expected to serve as
a starting point for a debate on changing Dodd-Frank this year”).
9. The analysis is consistent with the patriotism and good faith of the provisions’
sponsors. The error is conceptual and not (necessarily) born of conﬂict or misaligned
incentives. It is important to emphasize, as well, that the focus of this Piece is on provisions
that most directly implicate ﬁnancial stability. There are many other provisions of the
CHOICE Act—for example, relating to an overhaul of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau—that, whether good or bad based on other criteria, are unlikely to have a
signiﬁcant effect on ﬁnancial stability. These (many) other provisions are excluded from
the Piece’s analysis.
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than merely critique the law ex post. The mistake boils down to a failure
to grasp the functional equivalence of banks and shadow banks. This
leads to a failure to appreciate the negative externalities that shadow
banks can create—externalities that are devastating when they
materialize and are impervious to market solutions.10
This Piece explains the nature of banks and the regulatory response
they demand, and why shadow banks require a similar response.
Understanding the function and risks posed by shadow banks then serves
as a touchstone for critiquing key elements of the CHOICE Act. The
Piece argues that the provisions reveal a misguided belief that market
discipline is the key to ﬁnancial stability.11 Alas, the banking model, by its
very nature, is rife with market failures that demand a unique regulatory
response. Early indications are that when it comes to ﬁnancial stability,
the new Administration and Congress will move in the wrong direction.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Banks: The Problem and the Solution

Banks bring enormous economic beneﬁts12 but pose singular risks as
well. The principal risk is that depositors will “run,” deciding to withdraw
their money en masse.13 The problem with this is that banks do not keep
deposits in a vault.14 A run can lead a bank to suspend redemptions or to
10. The arguments about shadow banking and the response it demands are well
established, if not universally understood or embraced. See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, The
Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation 2 (2016) [hereinafter Ricks, The Money
Problem] (arguing shadow banking was “at the center of the recent ﬁnancial crisis”);
Volcker All., Unﬁnished Business: Banking in the Shadows 9–12 (2016) [hereinafter
Volcker Alliance Report], http://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
VolckerAlliance_UnfinishedBusinessBankingInTheShadows.pdf [http://perma.cc/7LKEDUT7] (noting that “the risk of busts and bailouts remains all too real” due to the
operation of shadow banks and offering policy solutions). It is important, however, to
apply them speciﬁcally to the most objectionable reforms under consideration.
11. To be clear, nothing in this analysis is inconsistent with the notion that market
discipline is essential to a functioning capitalist economy broadly conceived, nor with the
(clearly correct) view that it can play an important, albeit limited, role in bank regulation.
See generally John Crawford, Credible Losers: A Regulatory Design for Market Discipline,
54 Am. Bus. L.J. 107 (2017) [hereinafter Crawford, Credible Losers] (describing
mechanisms through which market discipline works and presenting a framework for
establishing discipline for systemically important ﬁnancial institutions).
12. Banks not only serve a valuable credit-intermediation role—it is more efficient for
the bank to channel deposits to creditworthy consumers and businesses than it would be
for depositors to try to make loans directly—but they also provide depositors with an
efficient technology for storing and then employing resources for near-term transactional
purposes. See, e.g., Richard Scott Carnell et al., The Law of Banking and Financial
Institutions 39–43 (5th ed. 2013).
13. George G. Kaufman, Bank Runs, Libr. Econ. & Liberty, http://www.econlib.org/
library/Enc/BankRuns.html [http://perma.cc/CNQ2-LKUF] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
14. As George Bailey (played by Jimmy Stewart) staves off a run in the classic movie
It’s a Wonderful Life, he explains to his bank customers:
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engage in ﬁre sales of assets, both of which can have deeply pernicious
knock-on effects.15 Furthermore, a run on one bank often triggers
contagious runs on sister banks.16 A “panic” ensues if there are
widespread runs on banks. Panics and the negative externalities they
spawn constitute the essence of a ﬁnancial crisis.17 Indeed, an asset
bubble bursting is generally not “systemic” unless it triggers such runs.
For example, the decline in stock market wealth after the dot-com crash
was as great as the decline in housing wealth during the recent crisis and
recession, but because the dot-com crash did not trigger a ﬁnancial
crisis—that is, widespread runs—it was comparatively benign.18 The

[Y]ou . . . you . . . you’re thinking of this place all wrong. As if I had the
money back in a safe. The, the money’s not here. Well, your money’s in
Joe’s house . . . . That’s right next to yours. And in the Kennedy house,
and in Mrs. Macklin’s house, and in a hundred others.
It’s a Wonderful Life (Liberty Films, Inc. 1946).
15. If depositors lose immediate access to their money, it may lead to consequential
losses: “opportunity costs, operational disruption, reputational damage, or even default.”
Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 75, 83
(2012) [hereinafter Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis]. On the other
hand, if the bank tries to raise cash quickly in order to meet redemption demands by
selling relatively illiquid assets (such as mortgages), it will often have to accept a price
below the assets’ “fundamental value.” This is a ﬁre sale. Fire sales can have extremely
pernicious knock-on effects. See, e.g., Anil K. Kashyap et al., Rethinking Capital
Regulation, in Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System 431, 440–42 (2008),
http://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/ﬁles/publicat/sympos/2008/kashyaprajanstein03
1209.pdf [http://perma.cc/BMF4-8JME]. Furthermore, to the degree the banks facing or
even fearing a run will hoard their liquid assets, it can have a serious negative effect on
new lending, thus depressing economic activity. See id. at 442.
16. This “contagion by simile” describes, for example, what happened to the money
market fund industry after the failure of Reserve Primary in September 2008. See Fin.
Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 353–56 (2011), http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [http://perma.cc/KD9Z-FUK7].
As described below, money market funds meet the functional deﬁnition of “bank.” See
infra note 40.
17. See Ricks, The Money Problem, supra note 10, at 102 (“[I]nsofar as ﬁnancial
stability is about avoiding macroeconomic disasters, it should concern itself mostly with
panic-prooﬁng.”); Timothy F. Geithner, Are We Safe Yet? How to Manage Financial Crises,
Foreign Aff., Jan./Feb. 2017, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/201612-12/are-we-safe-yet [http://perma.cc/PC3M-A3B4] [hereinafter Geithner, Are We Safe
Yet?] (“It’s important to understand why ﬁnancial systems are so vulnerable to crises. First,
and most important, they are inherently prone to panics and runs.”).
18. See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, Regulation,
Winter 2009–2010, at 34, 34, http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/
papers/cochrane_lessons_regulation.pdf [http://perma.cc/DU6G-FEZJ] (“The signature
event of [the 2008] ﬁnancial crisis was the ‘run,’ ‘panic,’ [or] ‘ﬂight to quality’ . . . . If that
panic had not occurred, it is likely that any economic contraction following the housing
bust would have been no worse than the mild 2001 recession that followed the dot-com
bust.”); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Some
Reﬂections on the Crisis and the Policy Response (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.htm
[http://perma.cc/NU82-VKFY] (comparing the housing crash to the dot-com crash and
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damage to the real economy that the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 wrought has
been severe and enduring.19
The American banking system suffered many similarly destabilizing,
and often devastating, ﬁnancial crises in the nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries.20 The problem of such crises was largely “solved” by
the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in
1933.21 With the introduction of deposit insurance to protect depositors’
principal, along with a special resolution regime to ensure depositors
could access their money without delay,22 the incentive to run was
removed. The “moral hazard” that arose with deposit insurance23 was
arguing that the principal difference lay in the fact that the former was partly caused by
the role of shadow banks while the latter was not).
19. See, e.g., Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Recovery from Financial
Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes, 104 Am. Econ. Rev. 50, 54 (2014) (noting the post2007 crisis was “one of the most severe multi-year crises on record in the advanced
economies”); Martin Wolf, The Long and Painful Journey to World Disorder, Fin. Times
(Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.ft.com/content/ef13e61a-ccec-11e6-b8ce-b9c03770f8b1 (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining how the ﬁnancial crisis and subsequent
Eurozone crisis “had devastating economic effects: a sudden jump in unemployment
followed by relatively weak recoveries” and noting that the “economies of the advanced
countries are roughly a sixth smaller today than they would have been if pre-crisis trends
had continued”).
20. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis 9–10
(2013) (identifying six banking panics between 1873 and 1914); Gary B. Gorton,
Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming 29 (2012) (quoting
a commentator’s claim in 1899 that “[s]ince 1793 panics have occurred [in the United
States] in the following years: 1797, 1811, 1813, 1816, 1819, 1825, 1837, 1847, 1857, 1866,
1873, 1884, 1890, and 1893”); Geithner, Are We Safe Yet?, supra note 17 (“In the ﬁve or so
decades before the Great Depression, U.S. banks possessed much higher levels of capital,
and yet the United States still experienced an appalling number of enormously damaging
banking panics.”).
21. It is important to note that the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s did not
involve a panic, precisely because the institutions in question had deposit insurance. The
S&L crisis laid bare some signiﬁcant ﬂaws in the implementation of bank regulation—
ﬂaws that were at least partially addressed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991. See, e.g., Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse
Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, 12 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 317, 325 (1993).
Importantly, however, unlike panics, “the savings and loan debacle was not accompanied by
a severe macroeconomic disaster . . . [but only] a mild and brief recession.” Morgan Ricks,
Safety First? The Deceptive Allure of Full Reserve Banking, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. Online 113,
121 (2016) [hereinafter Ricks, Safety First?], http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.
uchicago.edu/ﬁles/uploads/Dialogue/Ricks_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/J74F-S7JX].
22. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f)(1) (2012).
23. Moral hazard refers to the fact that those who are insured against a bad outcome
may take less care in avoiding that outcome. In this context, private actors—depositors
and bank shareholders and executives—will not bear the full costs of a bank failure and so
may not take as much care as they should to avoid this outcome, particularly since
strategies that lead to higher proﬁts in good states of the world increase the likelihood of
failure in bad states of the world. See Carnell et al., supra note 12, at 282–83. Risky
corporate bonds, for example, pay a higher yield than Treasuries but are also likelier to
default. See Moody’s Inv’r Serv., Corporate Default and Recovery Rates 1920–2010 (2011),
http://eﬁnance.org.cn/cn/FEben/Corporate%20Default%20and%20Recovery%20Rates,
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addressed primarily by intrusive supervision, capital requirements, and
portfolio and activity constraints.24 The system worked: It led to an
extended “Quiet Period” of ﬁnancial stability that coincided with robust
growth and a moderation in the business cycle.25
B.

Two Approaches to Financial Regulation

The regulatory approach just described combines a safety net with
risk constraints and intrusive supervision to “solve” the problem of
banks. It is important to distinguish this “banking regulatory approach”
from what this Piece will refer to as the “capital markets” approach to
regulation.26 The banking regulatory approach, sometimes referred to as
prudential regulation, or “safety and soundness” regulation, is distinguished by three features: (i) an emphasis on protecting the principal
of a certain class of creditors—namely, depositors; (ii) an emphasis on
preventing institutional failure;27 and (iii) a special resolution regime to
prevent systemic spillovers in the event a bank does fail.28 This characterizes the regulatory approach of the so-called banking regulators,
including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, and
the Federal Reserve.
The “capital markets” approach, in contrast, characterizes traditional regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).29
1920-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/89QJ-UWX9] (providing historical corporate bond
default rates); Donald Marron, The Day the United States Defaulted on Treasury Bills,
Forbes (May 26, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/05/26/the-day-theunited-states-defaulted-on-treasury-bills/#2f2d9bac30ad (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (explaining that contrary to popular belief that the United States government has
never defaulted on its obligations, it has done so once in 1979); Tracking Bond
Benchmarks, Wall St. J.: Mkt. Data Ctr., http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022bondbnchmrk.html [http://perma.cc/42CM-KFGB] (last visited Mar. 29, 2017)
(providing information on yields for different debt instruments).
24. Lending by the Federal Reserve also played an important role for solvent banks
facing temporary liquidity problems. For a good overview of this overarching regulatory
approach, see Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, supra note 15, at 103.
25. See Gary B. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007, at 11
(2010).
26. See, e.g., John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 95, 113 n.86 (2015) [hereinafter Crawford, The Moral Hazard
Paradox].
27. This informs the various risk constraints imposed on banks, as well as emergency
lending. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (examining regulatory reaction to the
2007 ﬁnancial crisis).
28. See generally FDIC, Resolutions Handbook (2014), http://www.fdic.gov/about/
freedom/drr_handbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/D8AV-VM6F]. FDIC resolution prevents
contagion from a bank failure in ways the existing Bankruptcy Code cannot. See, e.g.,
Crawford, Credible Losers, supra note 11, at 135–36.
29. See, e.g., What We Do, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [http://
perma.cc/XH6G-FQ8P] (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (“The mission of the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”).
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The SEC regulates a wide variety of nondepository ﬁnancial institutions,
including the classic Wall Street securities ﬁrms, sometimes referred to as
“broker-dealers,”30 that specialize in activities such as underwriting
securities offerings, “market-making,”31 offering advisory services, and
arranging ﬁnancing for corporate mergers and takeovers. The SEC has
traditionally focused on preventing fraud and manipulation in securities
markets; its focus has not been on preventing particular ﬁrms’ failure.32
Likewise, while it tries to protect investors from fraud,33 it does not try to
prevent informed risk-taking or to protect investors from principal losses
when their bets turn out badly. This approach is much less prescriptive
and intrusive than the banking approach and seeks to harness rather
than supplant market forces.
The capital markets approach is appropriate when a ﬁrm’s failure
and investors’ losses do not create signiﬁcant negative externalities—
which is generally the case when ﬁrms do not fund their activities with
deposits or other short-term borrowings that function as deposit equivalents. Firms that do not fund themselves this way are generally not
susceptible to runs and therefore do not pose the threat to ﬁnancial
stability that banks do.34 Importantly, these distinctions are functional;
they turn on the risk different institutions create, which in turn derives
from the activities in which those ﬁrms engage. They do not depend on
legal forms or labels.
30. Confusingly, the largest of such ﬁrms are also sometimes referred to as
“investment banks”—but they are not banks as it has been understood in this Piece. The
term “broker-dealer” encompasses a broader universe of ﬁrms than just the large Wall
Street investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, but the Piece uses
the term because it maps onto the terminology of SEC regulation and avoids confusion
with the other deﬁnitions of “bank.” See, e.g., Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, SEC
(Apr. 2008), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm [http://perma.cc/
C3L5-KYAH].
31. A “market maker” is “a ﬁrm that stands ready to buy and sell a particular stock on
a regular and continuous basis at a publicly quoted price.” Fast Answers: Market Maker,
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mktmaker.htm [http://perma.cc/X3VZ-B4NE] (last
modiﬁed Mar. 17, 2000).
32. While preventing individual ﬁrm failure has not traditionally been the SEC’s
focus, there are nevertheless several rules that the SEC applies to broker-dealers that have
a weak prudential ﬂavor to them, most prominently a “net capital” rule, which serves as a
(very) rough analogue to bank capital and reserve requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1
(2016).
33. The SEC seeks to deter fraud directly through its enforcement arm. See generally
Division of Enforcement, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/enforce [http://perma.cc/K3NPDRJA] (last updated Apr. 14, 2015). It also oversees the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC), which insures brokerage customers against loss or theft of their cash
or securities after the failure of a broker-dealer—but not against decline in value due to
market movements. See What SIPC Protects, Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., http://www.sipc.org/forinvestors/what-sipc-protects [http://perma.cc/B69G-CMU8] (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
34. It is worth noting that there are other sources of run-like dynamics that may call
for more intrusive regulation, such as the collateral calls AIG faced in September 2008.
See Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, supra note 16, at 344–45.
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Shadow Banks and the Crisis

Although nonbanks cannot issue deposits, it turns out that they can
issue short-term debt that serves as the functional equivalent of
deposits,35 using the money thus raised to fund investments in long-term
assets. Entities that engage in this bank-like function outside the
regulatory framework and safety net that apply to banks are so-called
shadow banks.36 Regulating shadow banks under a capital markets
approach is a recipe for crisis.
Shadow banking has a long history37 but was largely dormant for
most of the Quiet Period.38 In the two decades leading up to the crisis of
2007–2009, however, shadow banking metastasized until it was as large as
or larger than the chartered banking system on the eve of the crisis.39
Prominent examples of shadow banks include money market funds40 and
broker-dealers funding themselves with commercial paper and repo
loans.41 Just as depository institutions were vulnerable to crises prior to
the establishment of the federal safety net, so shadow banks, without that
safety net, proved similarly vulnerable. Previous ﬁnancial crises in the
United States were characterized by runs on banks; the crisis in 2007 and

35. An example of such a deposit substitute is the repurchase agreement, or “repo
loan,” in which, for example, a money market fund makes a short-term loan—often
overnight—to a broker-dealer and receives collateral in return. The cash lender in this
case is the functional equivalent of a depositor, with a daily option not to roll over its
loan—that is, to withdraw its funding. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, The Shadow
Banking System: Implications for Financial Regulation 8 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff
Report No. 382, 2009), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr382.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Y7WU-XUXY] (“In a repo, the borrower sells a security today for a
price below the current market price on the understanding that it will buy it back in the
future at a pre-agreed price.”).
36. See, e.g., Ricks, The Money Problem, supra note 10, at ix (“To [the Crisis
Response Team at the U.S. Treasury, “shadow banking”] meant something . . . quite
speciﬁc. When we talked about shadow banking, we were referring to the ﬁnancial sector’s
use of vast amounts of short-term debt to fund portfolios of ﬁnancial assets.”).
37. Id. at 230–37.
38. See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking
System, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall 2010, at 261, 265 ﬁg.3, http://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/2010b_bpea_gorton.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
A4AH-X8ZZ].
39. Id.; see also Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking 8 fig.1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.
Staff Report No. 458, 2010), http://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/
staff_reports/sr458.pdf [http://perma.cc/2T2E-JVCX].
40. A money market fund offers investors “shares” that have traditionally maintained
a stable value of $1.00 and invests in a variety of instruments of short- to medium-term
maturity and low credit risk. The shares are redeemable on demand and function as close
substitutes for deposits for the money market fund investors. See Money Market Funds,
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfmmkt.htm [http://perma.cc/RK4D-BBXW] (last
updated Jan. 17, 2017).
41. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 38, at 261–62. For a description of repo loans, see
supra note 35.
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2008 was at core a run on shadow banks.42 Structurally, it was like the
earlier bank runs, but it manifested itself in a different institutional
setting: Instead of depositors lining up to make withdrawals from banks,
as during the early 1930s, large institutional investors decided en masse
not to roll over their short-term loans to broker-dealers, such as Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, and redeemed their “shares” in money
market funds.43
Ultimately, regulators were able to halt the panic by (among other
measures) extending the safety net to shadow banks.44 Of course, part of
the deal with commercial banks is that while they beneﬁt from the safety
net, they must submit to (often onerous) prudential rules and
supervision. The fact that shadow banks received safety-net support
without striking such a deal struck many as problematic. In the wake of
the crisis and the bailouts, one approach to the problem of shadow
banking would have been to try to stamp it out.45 Indeed, there is reason
to believe this would be the best approach, but it has little, if any, political
traction. As long as shadow banking exists, then the best way to mitigate
the inevitable fragility it creates is to apply as much of the banking
regulatory approach to it as possible.
D. Post-Crisis Reforms
Post-crisis reforms have been a mixed bag in addressing the shadow
banking system. On the one hand, Congress limited or removed
regulators’ authority to extend the safety net outside the traditional
banking system.46 On the other hand, the largest broker-dealers, a major
locus of shadow banking activity, are all now housed within bank holding
companies (BHCs).47 While these broker-dealers continue to be regulated by the SEC under a primarily “capital markets” approach, the
Federal Reserve regulates holding companies on a consolidated basis, so
there is a degree of prudential regulation that applies to the broker42. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 38, at 279–80.
43. See Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, supra note 16, at 280, 324, 363. For an
explanation of money market fund shares, see supra note 40.
44. See Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Financial Crisis Manual: A Guide to the Laws,
Regulations and Contracts of the Financial Crisis 24, 32 (2009), http://www.davispolk.com/
sites/default/files/files/Publication/d1ab7627-e45d-4d35-b6f1-ef356ba686f2/Preview/
PublicationAttachment/2a31cab4-3682-420e-926f-054c72e3149d/fcm.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E6Q7-BWCH].
45. See generally Ricks, The Money Problem, supra note 10 (arguing short-term
funding markets were the central problem to the ﬁnancial system).
46. See Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox, supra note 26, at 97 n.8, 121.
47. A BHC can own both banks and nonbank subsidiaries, such as broker-dealers or
asset managers. At the beginning of 2008, there were ﬁve large stand-alone investment
banks that were not housed in BHCs. Of these, one (Lehman Brothers) failed, Fin. Crisis
Inquiry Comm’n, supra note 16, at 324–44, two (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch) were
bought by large BHCs, id. at 353–88, and two (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley)
converted into BHCs, id.
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dealers as well.48 Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act established a special
“liquidation authority” to try to facilitate winding down a giant
nondepository ﬁnancial institution (such as a BHC) without creating
signiﬁcant negative systemic externalities.49 In sum, as former Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner has argued, there is less “dry tinder” in the
system, but the tools available to policymakers to respond to a crisis if
one occurs have, on net, been diminished.50 This should be a source of
concern, as shadow banking still thrives. Even if capital levels are higher
and short-term funding levels have declined slightly since 2008, there are
still trillions of dollars of uninsured deposit-like claims on institutions,
such as broker-dealers and money market funds, that remain outside the
safety net and that are subject to varying degrees of prudential regulation
(if any).51
II. THE PATH AHEAD: THE IMPACT OF PROPOSED REFORMS ON FINANCIAL
STABILITY
The thesis of this Piece is that the key to ﬁnancial stability is to apply
the banking regulatory approach to institutions and activities that
function like banks. For those that do not function like banks—that is, for
ﬁrms that are not vulnerable to runs—the capital markets approach is
entirely appropriate. Based on key provisions of the CHOICE Act,
however, there is reason to believe that legislative efforts in the coming
year(s) will move in the wrong direction on this front.

48. See generally Div. of Banking Supervision & Regulation, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual (2016), http://www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/bhc/bhc.pdf [http://perma.cc/KT3X-YUPF]
(providing guidance for regulating bank holding companies). For example, a BHC has to
meet capital requirements not just in its bank subsidiary but on a consolidated basis for
the entire holding company family. Id. § 4061.0; see also Geithner, Are We Safe Yet?, supra
note 17 (“Perhaps as important as the fact that capital requirements have grown in size is
that they now apply more widely . . . . Today, the largest investment banks are regulated as
bank holding companies, subjecting entire institutions to higher capital requirements.”).
It is important to note, however, that the broker-dealer does not enjoy automatic
access to the federal safety net—emergency lending by the Federal Reserve and deposit
insurance—as does the commercial bank that sits in the same holding company family. See
12 U.S.C. § 378 (2012) (prohibiting securities dealers from engaging in banking business);
What’s Covered, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/covered/ [http://perma.cc/QPM7DZ9M] (last updated Jan. 6, 2017); The Federal Reserve Discount Window,
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/Pages/General-Information/The-DiscountWindow.aspx [http://perma.cc/PG9E-R5DZ] (last updated June 22, 2015).
49. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394.
50. Geithner, Are We Safe Yet?, supra note 17 (describing constraints on ﬁscal and
monetary policy in the current environment as well as a decrease in “ﬁre-ﬁghting” tools).
51. Id. (describing higher capital levels and decreased reliance on uninsured shortterm funding in the ﬁnancial system); Volcker Alliance Report, supra note 10, at 14 ﬁg.1
(measuring uninsured short-term debt in the ﬁnancial system).
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The Financial Stability Oversight Council

Two key lessons of the ﬁnancial crisis were that large gaps existed in
our ﬁnancial regulatory structure and that no entity was responsible for
monitoring risks to the stability of the system as a whole. As a result, the
Dodd-Frank Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC), composed of the heads of all the federal ﬁnancial regulatory
agencies and chaired by the Treasury Secretary.52 The FSOC is
responsible for monitoring risk throughout the ﬁnancial system. The
principal new authority the FSOC wields is the power to designate
ﬁnancial institutions that are neither banks nor BHCs (both of which are
already prudentially regulated) as “systemically important,” thereby
subjecting them to prudential oversight by the Federal Reserve.53
This is important because some large nonbanks engage in extensive
shadow banking activities. For example, MetLife, an insurance company
that has been designated as systemically important by the FSOC but that
has fought this designation,54 funds itself with billions of dollars in shortterm debt—that is, with deposit substitutes.55 If MetLife’s short-term
creditors refused en masse to roll over their loans, it would be
functionally identical to, and create the risk of the same awful
externalities as, a traditional bank run. Indeed, if one understands why
banks demand a special regulatory response, it is hard to justify the lack
of such a regulatory response to a ﬁrm such as MetLife that engages so
extensively in shadow banking.
While the number of major ﬁrms engaged in shadow banking outside
of BHCs may be limited today, that can change rapidly, just as it did in
the decade or two leading up to the crisis. FSOC designation is the only
tool we have to ensure that some measure of prudential regulation is
applied to nonbanks engaged in shadow banking.
The FSOC is thus an essential component of post-2008 ﬁnancial
reform and plays a crucial role in maintaining systemic stability,
particularly as market actors adjust their activities to try to evade
regulation. Yet Republicans have expressed a good deal of hostility to the
FSOC,56 and the CHOICE Act would eliminate the FSOC’s designation
52. 12 U.S.C. § 5321.
53. Id. § 5323.
54. See Ryan Tracy, MetLife Asks Appeals Court to Uphold Removal of ‘SIFI’ Label,
Wall St. J. (Aug. 16, 2016, 10:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/metlife-asks-appealscourt-to-uphold-removal-of-siﬁ-label-1471355267 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
55. See Brief of Professors of Law & Finance as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant at
14–15, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016)
(No. 15-cv-00045-RMC), 2015 WL 3422509 (“Even more striking than the aggregate size of
MetLife’s debt is that MetLife ﬁnances so much of its activities through short-term
borrowing that must be repaid or reﬁnanced in the near term.”).
56. See, e.g., Max Abelson & Zachary Tracer, SEC’s Piwowar Calls FSOC ‘Vast LeftWing Conspiracy,’ Bloomberg News (July 16, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2014-07-15/sec-s-piwowar-calls-fsoc-vast-left-wing-conspiracy-.html
[http://perma.
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authority.57 Representative Hensarling stated recently that by “empowering
the FSOC to designate [systemically important ﬁnancial institutions], the
Dodd-Frank Act allows the Federal Reserve to impose bank-like standards
on nonbank institutions; in other words, to move institutions from the
non-bailout economy to the bailout economy.”58 Alas, it is not
designation that moves an institution into the “bailout” economy:59 It is
engaging in bank-like activities such that a run on the institution (and/or
its failure) creates potentially catastrophic costs for the ﬁnancial system.
Designation does nothing to increase the powers of regulators to “bail
out” a ﬁrm; it simply empowers regulators to compel shadow banks to
operate in a way that makes their failure less likely. The incentive to “bail
out” a ﬁrm is identical whether or not the ﬁrm has been designated.
In short, repeal of the FSOC’s designation authority is high on the
priority list of inﬂuential Republicans but is grounded in a confused and
rigidly formalistic conception about which entities demand a banking
regulatory approach. Repealing this authority will have a potentially
signiﬁcant destabilizing effect on the ﬁnancial system in coming years.
B.

Emergency Response Tools: Lending and Guarantee Authorities

As noted, Congress has already acted to limit regulators’ ﬁreﬁghting
tools in the years since the crisis: It has placed restrictions on the Federal
Reserve’s emergency lending authorities and eliminated the freestanding
guarantee authorities regulators used to limit the ﬁnancial wildﬁre in late
2008.60 The CHOICE Act would further tie regulators’ hands in
responding to a crisis.61 The desire to tie regulators’ hands reﬂects a view
cc/KT6J-ZBPD] (reporting Republican SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar’s comments
that the FSOC’s “initials really stand for ‘Firing Squad on Capitalism,’” and that the
Council is a “vast left-wing conspiracy to hinder capital formation,” “[t]he Bully Pulpit of
Failed Prudential Regulators,” and “[t]he Dodd-Frank Politburo”); Tracy, A Financial
Council Republicans Loathe, supra note 8 (describing one of the members of President
Trump’s FSOC transition team as executive director of “an advocacy group whose website
calls FSOC a ‘rogue regulator’ and asks readers to ‘Sock Back at FSOC’ by telling Congress
to curtail its power or abolish it”).
57. Financial CHOICE Act, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. § 211 (2016).
58. Press Release, Fin. Servs. Comm., Chairman Hensarling Once Again Calls on
FSOC to ‘Cease and Desist’ Too-Big-to-Fail Designations Until Questions Are Answered
(May 20, 2014), http://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=
380567 [http://perma.cc/4NCG-8G8N].
59. “Bailout” in this context means government support to prevent a ﬁrm from
defaulting on its debt obligations.
60. See supra text accompanying note 46.
61. H.R. 5983 §§ 243, 707. Perhaps most disturbingly, it would eliminate the statutory
provision providing a “systemic risk exception” to the requirement that the FDIC adopt
the “least cost” approach to resolving a bank. Id. § 242. Normally, the “least cost”
requirement means that the FDIC cannot protect uninsured creditors of a failed bank. See
12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2012). The systemic risk exception provides a way for it to do
so anyway if the majority of the FDIC Board and of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury Secretary all concur that doing so is necessary to preserve the
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that we should leave shadow banks entirely to the market, that the moral
hazard arising out of panic prevention in the shadow banking sector will
prove more costly than the fallout from the crises when they occur.
Again, this Piece argues that this view is wrong as applied to banks.62 If
one accepts that it is wrong as applied to banks, it is (again) hard to
justify adopting such a view with respect to shadow banks. As Secretary
Geithner wrote in his memoir, such an approach is like “[t]aking away
the ﬁre department’s equipment”—it “ensures that the equipment won’t
be used but it isn’t much of a strategy for reducing ﬁre damage.”63 Of
course, it is important to emphasize that emergency response tools and
safety nets must be coupled with prudential rules and supervisory
authority to mitigate moral hazard: This is the basic logic of the banking
approach to regulation.
C.

Resolution

Another key aspect of the CHOICE Act addresses what to do with
failing ﬁnancial behemoths. Putting a bank through bankruptcy would
be extremely disruptive, because bankruptcy is slow, and depositors,
unlike typical bondholders or equity claimants, need immediate access to
their accounts.64 Without such immediate access, there may be signiﬁcant
consequential damages for the depositors irrespective of any investment
losses, 65 and runs are more likely to spread to sister banks—a sort of contagion by simile.66 A key to the banking approach to regulation, then, is
providing a resolution mechanism that allows depositors of a failed bank
to get immediate access to their money. One of the reasons the failure of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was so disruptive is that many of its
short-term creditors were treating their claims on it like deposits—

ﬁnancial stability of the United States. See id. This provision played a critical role in
preventing an all-out collapse of the system in late 2008. See Crawford, The Moral Hazard
Paradox, supra note 26, at 114–15. Proposing its elimination evinces what Secretary
Geithner has called “moral hazard fundamentalism”—that is, a desire to constrain moral
hazard not as a means to an end (a robust ﬁnancial system and healthy economy) but as
an end in itself. Cf. Timothy F. Geithner, Stress Test: Reﬂections on Financial Crises 178
(2015) [hereinafter Geithner, Stress Test] (noting the government’s desire not “to bolster
the impression that government handouts were available upon request”).
62. Some commentators disagree and believe that the effects of deposit insurance are
pernicious. See, e.g., Charles Calomiris & Matthew Jaremski, Deposit Insurance: Theories
and Facts (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22223, 2016),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22223 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). This Piece
argues that this view is wrong, though it has the virtue of being more coherent than the
competing view that the banking regulatory approach should be adopted for banks but
not shadow banks.
63. Geithner, Stress Test, supra note 61, at 430.
64. See Crawford, Credible Losers, supra note 11, at 135–36.
65. See Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, supra note 15, at 83.
66. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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making Lehman a large shadow bank—but there was no special
mechanism available to unwind it.67
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act was crafted to respond to this
problem: The “orderly liquidation authority” empowered the FDIC—
after an invocation procedure that, like the systemic risk exception
discussed above, requires the concurrence of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury—to resolve
nonbanks in a process intended to mirror the bank resolution process.68
The CHOICE Act would repeal Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and
replace it with a new subchapter of the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11,
Subchapter V (Subchapter V).69 Many of the provisions of Subchapter V
appear to mimic the best features of the Dodd-Frank Act. There are,
however, at least two signiﬁcant disadvantages of Subchapter V vis-à-vis
Title II from a ﬁnancial-stability perspective. First, the CHOICE Act
would not permit regulators to trigger a Subchapter V bankruptcy
ﬁling.70 As Professors Mark Roe and David Skeel argue,
If the regulators think that a bankruptcy is needed, but that a
bailout or alternative resolution process is not needed, they
cannot directly force a ﬁling. . . .
True, regulators can pressure bank managers to reluctantly
ﬁle, but the regulators may have to concede conditions to bank
executives to make them ﬁle quickly; if the bank does not ﬁle
quickly, the regulators may decide that to save the economy,
they have to bail the bank out. In the extreme case, bank
management may just refuse to ﬁle for bankruptcy.71
Second, while Title II can be invoked for any nondepository
ﬁnancial company,72 Subchapter V would be available for a narrower
category of ﬁrms.73 This leaves open the possibility that signiﬁcant
shadow banks that do not ﬁt under the narrower deﬁnition of “covered
ﬁnancial company” would have only the preexisting provisions of the

67. Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, supra note 16, at 324–43.
68. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394 (2012). For an analysis of plans that regulators have
developed to implement Title II, see generally Crawford, Credible Losers, supra note 11,
at 137–47.
69. Financial CHOICE Act, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. §§ 1181–1192 (2016).
70. Id. § 232 (revising Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code).
71. Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy for Banks: A Sound Concept that
Needs Fine-Tuning, N.Y. Times: DealBook (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/08/17/business/dealbook/bankruptcy-for-banks-a-sound-concept-that-needsﬁne-tuning.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (critiquing a stand-alone version of
this bankruptcy reform that had made its way into an appropriations bill).
72. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381(a)(8), 5383. Depository institutions are excluded, of course,
because they are already subject to a special resolution regime.
73. H.R. 5983 § 231(a) (deﬁning “covered ﬁnancial corporations” as comprising only
(i) BHCs or (ii) other large holding companies that “exist[] for the primary purpose of
owning, controlling and ﬁnancing [their] subsidiaries” but excluding stockbrokers and
commodity brokers).
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Bankruptcy Code as a resolution option going forward, recreating the
very problem that Title II of Dodd-Frank was written to solve.74 Again,
then, the CHOICE Act evinces a failure of imagination and understanding in grasping the core problem of ﬁnancial stability: bank-like
functions and risks that lie in the regulatory shadows.
D. Capital
One of the key ingredients of prudential regulation is capital
requirements. Capital is a measure of the difference between what a bank
owns (its assets) and what it owes (its debts).75 The thicker a bank’s
capital buffer, the more losses it can absorb before tipping into
insolvency. Leading up to the crisis, the nation’s shadow banks—
particularly broker-dealers funding themselves with short-term debt—
were operating with capital buffers that were razor thin.76 One of the
more intriguing provisions of the CHOICE Act would permit banks and
BHCs that meet a 10% leverage ratio—equivalent to a capital buffer of
10% of a ﬁrm’s total assets77—to be relieved of a wide array of other
prudential regulations.78 The provision seems to hinge on a belief that
with higher capital in place, we can relax about the risk of panics and
allow a capital markets approach to govern. There are several problems
with this view. First, while it is true that higher capital requirements are
better for stability if all else is equal, all else is not equal here. Because a
ﬁrm opting into this regime would, for example, be relieved of meeting
risk-based capital requirements, we should expect such ﬁrms to migrate to
a much riskier portfolio of assets.79 It is not clear that a ﬁrm with a 10%
leverage ratio but holding risky assets is less likely to fail or to create
systemic knock-on effects than a ﬁrm with a 5% leverage ratio holding
primarily “safe” assets.
74. The problem with the CHOICE Act’s deﬁnition is not that there are lots of
shadow banks that would fail to ﬁt within it right now but rather that shadow banking can
shift to forms that do not rely on the holding company structures that are Subchapter V’s
focus.
75. Note that this is distinct from reserve requirements, which mandate that banks
hold a certain percentage of their deposit base in cash (or as deposits with the Federal
Reserve). Capital requirements have nothing to do with how much cash a bank holds;
rather, they have to do with how much debt a bank can take on relative to equity. Bank
capital requirements are extremely complicated in detail, see 12 C.F.R. § 3.10 (2016), but
straightforward conceptually. See Carnell et al., supra note 12, at 217–18 (distinguishing
different usages of “capital” from the usage in bank regulation). See generally Anat
Admati & Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes (2013) (providing a lucid conceptual
account of bank capital).
76. Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, supra note 16, at xix.
77. For every $10 in assets, then, the ﬁrm would have $1 in capital to absorb losses.
78. H.R. 5983 §§ 101–102.
79. Id. § 102. Banks currently have to meet both risk-based requirements and a
(lower) leverage ratio that is unadjusted for risk—a sort of belt-and-suspenders approach
to capital regulation. 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2012).
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More fundamentally, capital requirements are an extremely clumsy
and unreliable tool on their own for preventing panics. In the era prior to
the development of the federal safety net, bank capital levels were
signiﬁcantly higher than 10%, but runs and panics occurred every decade
or two.80 Although there must be a point at which higher capital would
“solve” the problem of ﬁnancial crises—at the limit, one could force all
intermediation to be funded with 100% equity and all deposit-taking
institutions to hold 100% reserves81—there is no proposal with any
political traction that comes close to such a level.82
To be sure, the current combination of capital, liquidity, and other
prudential standards as applied to BHCs (which house a large portion of
the shadow banking industry in their nondeposit subsidiaries) does not
“panic-proof” the system, even as it marks an improvement over a laissez
faire approach.83 Perhaps trading higher capital for scaled-back regulation in other areas will get us a similar degree of protection for lower
cost. Perhaps not. Either way, its effect on ﬁnancial stability is likely to be
small relative to the risks we face, and the provision (again) betrays a
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of those risks.
CONCLUSION
The United States remains vulnerable to ﬁnancial crises and the
terrible economic damage they cause. The ﬁrst and most critical step to
ameliorating this problem is to grasp that it is banks’ economic function
rather than legal form that demands a special regulatory response. That
economic function—funding long-term investments with large amounts
of short-term debt—is valuable but can impose appalling costs on the
real economy when left solely to the discipline of market forces. The
United States largely solved this problem with respect to legal depositories, allowing banks’ valuable economic functions to thrive while
containing the cost through the combination of a safety net and safetyand-soundness regulation. We have extended only pieces of this
approach to shadow banks. Greater stability requires either suppressing
80. On bank capital levels in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, see
Admati & Hellwig, supra note 75, at 30–31. On the frequency of ﬁnancial crises in this era,
see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 357, 360 (2016) (proposing full reserve banking).
82. Professor Anat Admati is perhaps the most prominent advocate for higher capital
levels, proposing leverage ratios in the range of 20–30%. See Admati & Hellwig, supra note
75, at 179. Even if full reserve banking proposals had political support, it is worth
reiterating that such an approach would be inferior to the classic banking regulatory
model of the Quiet Period, which combined (lower) capital levels with a safety net and
prudential supervision. See generally Ricks, Safety First?, supra note 21.
83. This is a function of the continuing existence of trillions of dollars in runnable
funding outside the safety net. See Volcker Alliance Report, supra note 10, at 21; Geithner,
Are We Safe Yet?, supra note 17.
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shadow banks altogether or applying the banking regulatory approach
more completely to them. A key criterion for judging ﬁnancial reform
efforts in the new Administration will be whether they move us further
from this end or closer to it.

